The 2025 State Budget Act K 2/25
1. On 6 May 2025, the Constitutional Tribunal – after considering, at the hearing, the application of the President of the Republic of Poland, lodged to institute an a posteriori review – delivered its judgment on the 2025 State Budget Act’s provisions determining expenditure ceilings for the Constitutional Tribunal and the National Council of the Judiciary.
The Tribunal adjudicated that:
“1. Article 1(2) of the 2025 State Budget Act of 9 January 2025, in the part concerning Annex no. 2 part 06 on the Constitutional Tribunal – insofar as it determines a lower expenditure ceiling for the Constitutional Tribunal than the amount set in the 2025 State Budget Bill, submitted to the Sejm by the Council of Ministers on 30 September 2024, as a result of which the challenged provision limits the Constitutional Tribunal’s possibility of performing its constitutionally specified tasks – is inconsistent with Article 10, Article 188 and Article 189 in conjunction with Article 195(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
2. Article 1(2) of the Act referred to in point 1, in the part concerning Annex no. 2 part 52 on the National Council of the Judiciary – insofar as it determines a lower expenditure ceiling for the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ) than the amount set in the 2025 State Budget Bill, submitted to the Sejm by the Council of Ministers on 30 September 2024, as a result of which the challenged provision limits the NCJ’s possibility of performing its constitutionally specified tasks – is inconsistent with Article 10, Article 179 and Article 186 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland”.
The Tribunal discontinued the review proceedings as to the remainder.
The ruling was unanimous.
2. The present case was precedential in nature for two reasons. Firstly, it concerned the situation where – in a manner, so far, unheard of in the history of a democratic state ruled by law – the legislative branch of government had introduced an unprecedented limitation to the budget of the Constitutional Tribunal and to the budget of the National Council of the Judiciary, which would hinder or prevent the performance of duties by those constitutional state authorities. Secondly, the subject of the review did not comprise general and abstract norms, but financial plans of public-sector entities recognised in the State Budget Act. In the Polish legal system, a State Budget Act primarily functions as an act of financial planning which, on the one hand, encompasses public-sector revenue forecasts and, on the other hand, provides authorisation for eligible entities to incur expenditure up to the set spending ceilings.
A State Budget Act constitutes a legal act for which the Constitution has determined the substance and the period of being in force (Art. 219 of the Constitution). The Constitution, in a detailed way, also regulates the autonomous procedural rules for drafting a State Budget Bill, enacting the Bill, and reporting the implementation of the State Budget Act. In particular, the Constitution regulates time limits for the relevant activities of the executive (Art. 222 and 224(1), Art. 225, Art. 226(1) of the Constitution), the legislature (Art. 223, Art. 225, Art. 226(2) of the Constitution), and the judiciary (Art. 224(2) of the Constitution). The purpose underlying the constitution-maker’s detailed regulation of the procedure for adopting a State Budget Act is to provide a basis for managing state finances. The existence of the state’s binding financial plan is indispensable for the effective functioning of public authorities. The constitution-maker has granted this matter precedence over the principle that public authorities act on the basis of, and within the limits of, the law (Art. 219(4) of the Constitution).
Pursuant to Article 188(1) of the Constitution, the Constitutional Tribunal adjudicates in cases concerning the conformity of statutes to the Constitution. The said competence of the Tribunal has not been ruled out with regard to a State Budget Act – in fact, the Constitution explicitly provides for such a possibility in its Article 224(2). Nevertheless, so far, the Tribunal had not ruled on the unconstitutionality of any provisions of a State Budget Act. In its jurisprudence (case law), the Tribunal indicated that: “only in exceptional circumstances – in the case of a manifest violation of constitutional values – may the Tribunal interfere with the state’s financial plan, such as a State Budget Act, and declare specific provisions thereof to be in breach of constitutional norms. With regard to a State Budget Act, the presumption of constitutionality is particularly strong” (cf. the Tribunal’s judgment of 13 December 2004, ref. no. K 20/04, OTK ZU 11A/2004, item 115). The above-mentioned characteristics of a State Budget Act give rise to two fundamental problems which the Constitutional Tribunal had to take into account in the present case.
Firstly, what constituted the subject of the Tribunal’s review was the state’s financial plan, which the Constitution explicitly requires to be binding. Public authorities must prevent a situation where the state will be deprived (even partially) of a state financial plan. That requirement also applies to the Constitutional Tribunal, within the scope of examining the present case, as well as to the government, the legislature, and courts, which in the course of enacting or applying the law will implement this judgment. Due to the particularly strong presumption of constitutionality of a State Budget Act, the elimination thereof from the legal system (whether in its entirety or with regard to particular provisions on financial planning) may only occur as a last resort. By eliminating an unconstitutional legal norm, the Tribunal should make all efforts to preserve a State Budget Act, and all its financial planning components, in force. Hence, in the first place, the Tribunal should examine whether it is possible to eliminate an unconstitutional legal norm by derogating a given provision only within a certain extent.
Secondly, the subject of the review comprised financial planning components [of the State Budget Act] setting expenditure ceilings for public-sector entities. Thus, the Tribunal examined legal norms which were not made up of words, but of figures. If a judgment, to a certain extent, eliminates a given norm from the legal system, then that extent needs to be specified. Consequently, when issuing its judgment on unconstitutionality within a certain extent, the Tribunal was required to indicate a specific numerical point of reference. The judgment would otherwise have failed to fulfil its elementary function. Indeed, a judgment failing to specify the said extent would not have resulted in eliminating the unconstitutional legal norm, but it would have comprised a mere proposal which neither the legislature nor the government would have the obligation to implement. A judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of a provision of the State Budget Act within a certain extent – without specifying the said extent, by indicating a numerical point of reference – would in its nature have resembled a signalling decision, and would not have constituted the outcome of a properly conducted hierarchical review of norms.
The Constitutional Tribunal does not question the legislature’s competence to shape the content of a State Budget Act. However, this does not entail that such a statute – which is an outcome of the legislature’s activity – may not be subjected to the Tribunal’s review of the statute’s conformity to the Constitution, even if it concerns the Tribunal itself.
3. The so-called “budgetary autonomy”, i.e. the legal institution set out in Article 139 of the Public Finance Act, does not, in itself, constitute a constitutional value. However, it does play a key role in the protection of other constitutional values – above all, in the context of the principle of the separation and balance of powers, expressed in Article 10(1) of the Constitution. With regard to the executive (the government), the said “budgetary autonomy” directly limits the possibility of affecting the financial plans of entities that are separate from the executive (the government), including the Constitutional Tribunal, which constitutes part of the judicial branch of government – being separate and independent of the other branches of government, as well as including the National Council of the Judiciary, which safeguards the independence of courts and judges. State-budget funds must be continuously guaranteed to constitutional authorities so that they could efficiently, and without any interruption, fulfil their constitutional and statutory duties, as well as pay their liabilities. It is natural that, in a democratic state ruled by law, where the constitutional order is based on the separation and balance of powers, the activities of independent constitutional public authorities clash with the short-term political interests of the government and parliament. Thus, in order to enable the said authorities to carry out their constitutional and statutory tasks, it is necessary to provide those authorities with a permanent source of revenue. Budgetary independence constitutes an indispensable component of the systemic and competence independence. The constitution-maker has ultimately decided that the state’s basic financial plan is adopted in the form of a single act (the principle of the formal unity of a State Budget Act) and has not chosen to regulate an independent budget for judicial authorities (such a solution exists e.g. in Bulgaria). Thus, the aforementioned “budgetary autonomy” constitutes a kind of compromise to reconcile two values, namely: the formal unity of a State Budget Act and the need to enable constitutional authorities to perform their tasks effectively.
4. The special nature of a State Budget Act also determines the legislature’s position in the procedure for adopting the said statute. First of all, unlike in the case of other acts, the legislature may not, at any time, decide whether or not to adopt the said statute. This is a constitutional obligation that the legislature must fulfil by observing the numerous requirements, time-limits, and restrictions set out in Chapter X of the Constitution. Also, of great significance is the fact that the Constitution does not only limit the legislature’s freedom in formal aspects, but also as regards the substance.
A State Budget Act constitutes a financial plan forecasting state revenue and expenditure. In accordance with the principle of completeness (universality) and the principle of formal unity, the said plan must encompass the expenditure directly arising from the Constitution, statutes, international agreements, or any other sources of liabilities. In a democratic state ruled by law, it is inconceivable for public authorities to refuse to pay a legally determined benefit. A State Budget Act must, with no exception, include any legally determined expenditure. Indeed, with reference to such expenditure, a State Budget Act does not introduce anything new, but it merely reflects the state’s financial needs arising from other relevant legal acts.
Undoubtedly, such legally determined expenditure comprises the expenditure of the Constitutional Tribunal and the National Council of the Judiciary. Those authorities fulfil their constitutional duties, the scope of which is specified at the statutory level. Their expenditure ceilings set in a State Budget Act are not intended for their discretionary use, but for the purpose of fulfilling their obligations under the Constitution, and for paying their liabilities, as representatives of the State Treasury. The budgets of those authorities do not create their scope of competence or their role in the constitutional order, but are derived therefrom. This must be borne in mind, by the managers of those institutions, in the process of drafting particular financial plans, as well as by the legislature at the stage of authorising them.
In the procedure for adopting a State Budget Act, limitations to the legislature's freedom in its formal aspects are set forth explicitly in the Constitution, whereas limitations as to substantive aspects of the said freedom must be derived from the constitutional norms indicated above. As the present case was the first one where financial planning components of a State Budget Act were assessed, the Tribunal had to identify those limitations. However, the said limitations directly related to the subject of review in the present case, namely the financial plans of the Constitutional Tribunal and the National Council of the Judiciary, being constitutional authorities to which the aforementioned “budgetary autonomy” applied. Thus, the Tribunal formulated budgetary guarantees that the legislature must comply with, when enacting the financial plans of those authorities:
1) the relevant financial planning components of a State Budget Act must provide the constitutional authorities with sufficient funds that are necessary for the efficient, continuous, and full implementation of constitutionally, and statutorily, defined tasks;
2) the relevant financial planning components of a State Budget Act must provide the constitutional authorities with sufficient funds that are necessary for the continuous and timely regulation of contractual financial obligations, for the payment of which they are responsible as representatives of the State Treasury;
3) any significant changes in the relevant financial planning components of a State Budget Act should result from constitutional or statutory changes made to the scope of tasks assigned to constitutional authorities, or to the model of their operation. A State Budget Act should not create a new model of operation for those authorities, but should merely reflect the established one;
4) the relevant financial planning components of a State Budget Act must take account of the constitutional necessity for the authorities to operate in a continuous manner and for numerous years, as well as of their developed modus operandi, especially the work of the clerical personnel. The authorities must be able to adapt in advance to operate in new financial realities;
5) with regard to the Constitutional Tribunal, the legislature must take account of Article 195(2) of the Constitution, and its guarantee functions in the context of the remuneration of the said Tribunal’s judges.
5. In the present case, the financial planning components of the 2025 State Budget Act did not meet the above-mentioned guarantees. As the applicant argued, and as the Constitutional Tribunal also established, the legislature's actions made it impossible for the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ) to pay remuneration to the NCJ’s members, and to reimburse the travel expenses and accommodation costs to the persons delegated to perform duties in the NCJ’s Office. With regard to the Constitutional Tribunal, the legislature had drastically reduced the funds primarily allocated for the remuneration of judges and administrative staff. Those changes had effectively made it more difficult for those authorities to fulfil their constitutional and statutory duties and pay their liabilities. What is of significance in this context is the fact that the said cuts in the spending of the Constitutional Tribunal and the NCJ were not accompanied by any changes to the Constitution, or even to the statutes regulating the functioning of those institutions. Those authorities had had no possibility of preparing in advance for the actions of the legislature. In 2024, they had planned the drafts of their institutional budgets in accordance with the binding law and the well-established practice. Then they were confronted with such a state of affairs only after the legally effective commencement of the “budgetary year”.
Such a fundamental change, unprecedented in the history of the functioning of those two institutions, effectively hindered their complete and efficient fulfilment of their unchanged constitutional and statutory duties, and the payment of their liabilities. It is further clear from the Tribunal's findings on the legislative process that the legislature's primary objective was not to seek necessary budgetary savings or to streamline the operation of those authorities. On the contrary, the legislature deliberately took measures aimed at limiting the capacity of the Constitutional Tribunal and the NCJ to carry out their activities, where the former is part of the judiciary and the latter safeguards the independence of courts and judges.
This clearly violates the principle of the separation of powers under Article 10 of the Constitution, as well as the provisions regulating the scope of those authorities’ duties: Articles 188 and 189 of the Constitution in the case of the Constitutional Tribunal; and Articles 186 and 179 of the Constitution with regard to the NCJ. Moreover, the legislature determined the Tribunal's current expenditure ceiling with the intention to deprive the Tribunal's judges of their remuneration that was due. Leaving aside the fact that the binding statutory provisions on the status of judges of the Constitutional Tribunal which specify the amounts of their remuneration were left unchanged, the provision of the 2025 State Budget Act, in the adopted version, directly violates Article 195(2) of the Constitution, which states that judges of the Constitutional Tribunal receive remuneration consistent with the dignity of the office and the scope of their duties.
Therefore, Article 1(2) of the 2025 State Budget Act of 9 January 2025, in the part concerning Annex no. 2 part 06 on the Constitutional Tribunal – insofar as it determines a lower expenditure ceiling for the Constitutional Tribunal than the amount set in the 2025 State Budget Bill, submitted to the Sejm by the Council of Ministers on 30 September 2024, as a result of which the challenged provision limits the Constitutional Tribunal’s possibility of performing its constitutionally specified tasks – is inconsistent with Article 10, Article 188 and Article 189 in conjunction with Article 195(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Moreover, Article 1(2) of the Act referred to in point 1, in the part concerning Annex no. 2 part 52 on the National Council of the Judiciary – insofar as it determines a lower expenditure ceiling for the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ) than the amount set in the 2025 State Budget Bill, submitted to the Sejm by the Council of Ministers on 30 September 2024, as a result of which the challenged provision limits the NCJ’s possibility of performing its constitutionally specified tasks – is inconsistent with Article 10, Article 179 and Article 186 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
Due to the subject-matter of the Tribunal’s review, the scope of the Tribunal's judgment had to be delineated by indicating a specific numerical point of reference. The Constitutional Tribunal, as the so-called “negative legislator” has no power to determine any financial planning components of a State Budget Act with regard to public-sector entities, and thus the Tribunal indicated the already existing relevant financial planning components as the reference point. The Tribunal made reference to the 2025 State Budget Bill [submitted to the Sejm by the Council of Ministers on 30 September 2024] as it was the only existing reference point. Moreover, the said draft was the basis for managing state finances at the beginning of the “budgetary year”, in accordance with Article 219(4) of the Constitution, and its content meets the budgetary guarantees indicated in the judgment.
6. The judgment leaves in force the financial planning components of the 2025 State Budget Act which are declared unconstitutional herein. However, the judgment has the direct effect by derogating them, insofar as they determine lower expenditure ceilings, respectively, for the Constitutional Tribunal (in point 1 of the operative part of the judgment) and the NCJ (in point 2 of the operative part of the judgment), than the amounts set in the 2025 State Budget Bill, submitted to the Sejm on 30 September 2024 (Sejm Paper no. 687, the 10th parliamentary term).
The judgment (for obvious reasons) does not modify the constitutional and statutory duties of the Tribunal and the NCJ. Neither does it affect the amounts of those authorities’ liabilities, with regard to judges or employees. As a result of the judgment, the legislature should forthwith amend the 2025 State Budget Act to adjust the relevant financial planning components of the Act to the content of this ruling.
The adjudicating bench of the Constitutional Tribunal in the case was composed of: Judge Rafał Wojciechowski – Presiding Judge; President of the Constitutional Tribunal, Judge Bogdan Święczkowski – Judge Rapporteur; Judge Krystyna Pawłowicz; Judge Stanisław Piotrowicz; and Judge Andrzej Zielonacki.