Two Bills adopted by the Sejm with regard to the Constitutional Tribunal Kp 3/24
At the hearings on 2 April and 29 July 2025, the Constitutional Tribunal considered, in the course of an a priori review, the joined applications by the President of the Republic of Poland, lodged with regard to the Constitutional Tribunal Bill of 13 September 2024 and the Bill of 13 September 2024 – the Introductory Provisions to the Constitutional Tribunal Act, both adopted by the Sejm.
By its judgment of 29 July 2025, the Constitutional Tribunal adjudicated that certain provisions indicated by the President of the Republic of Poland were inconsistent with the Constitution. Consequently, the Tribunal stated that both Bills adopted by the Sejm were inconsistent with the Constitution, since the unconstitutional provisions were inextricably linked with the entire legislation under review.
As noted by the Constitutional Tribunal, the core of the legislation under review comprised the autonomous and retroactive provisions [of the Bill of 13 September 2024 – the Introductory Provisions to the Constitutional Tribunal Act] invalidating the election of judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, voiding the Tribunal’s rulings, and terminating the term of office of the incumbent President of the Constitutional Tribunal. The said provisions ruin the basis of the constitutional organisational structure of the Constitutional Tribunal as an independent authority of the judicial branch of government. They constitute infringements of the following: the constitutional principle of the separation of and balance between the [legislative, executive, and judicial] powers as well as the principle of cooperation between the branches of government; and also the principle of independence of judges. The constitute the legislature’s inadmissible interference with the minimum [core] competence of the judiciary, and a violation of the principle that the Constitutional Tribunal’s rulings are final and universally binding. The said provisions also constitute an infringement of the principles arising from Article 2 of the Constitution, and in particular the principle of trust in the law, and Article 7 of the Constitution, since they go beyond the scope of the ordinary legislature’s competence by interfering, without a legal basis, with the realm of the constitutional subject-matter.
As regards the procedural provisions under review, the Constitutional Tribunal stated, inter alia, that assigning the General Assembly of the Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal with the determination of the composition of adjudicating panels might result in blocking the Tribunal’s adjudication activity, and thus infringed the principle of diligence in the work of public institutions as well as the principles of legal certainty and of trust in the law. Moreover, the Tribunal noted that it was inadmissible to extend the judicial term of office beyond the fixed number of years (9 years) specified in the Constitution. The Sejm’s determination of a relatively short time-limit for the President of the Republic of Poland to give the oath of office [to a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal] violates the following: the principle that public authorities function on the basis of, and within the limits of, the law; the principle of diligence in the work of public institutions; and the principle of cooperation between the branches of government. By contrast, the possibility that the aforementioned oath of office is given by a notary public contradicts both the Polish President’s role in the process of appointing judges, as well as the significance and nature of the swearing in of a Constitutional Tribunal judge. In addition, the participation of retired judges of the Constitutional Tribunal in disciplinary proceedings, which may lead to the removal of a Constitutional Tribunal judge from office is inconsistent with the principle of the separation of powers and the principle of the independence of the Tribunal and its judges.
The Tribunal deemed that the unconstitutionality of certain provisions challenged by the Polish President, due to their inextricable link with the entire legislation under review, results in the said President’s obligation not to sign both aforementioned Bills into law.
The judgment was delivered by the Constitutional Tribunal sitting en banc, with the President of the Constitutional Tribunal, Judge Bogdan Święczkowski, as the Presiding Judge, and the Vice-President of the Constitutional Tribunal, Judge Bartłomiej Sochański as the Judge Rapporteur.